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This  paper  discusses  the  potential  effectiveness  and  desirability  of 
activist monetary  policy1 and  also rules versus  discretion.  Recent  aca- 
demic discussions of  the role of  monetary policy have been heavily influ- 
enced by the rational expectations approach to macroeconomics:  it has 
been  argued  that,  from  the  viewpoint  of  the behavior  of  output,  any 
monetary policy rule strictly adhered to is as good as any other  (e.g., 
Sargent and Wallace  1975, Barro 1976). This theoretical viewpoint re- 
ceives support from empirical work by, among others, Sargent (1976~) 
and Barro (1977~1,  1978), which  appears to show that only unantici- 
pated changes in the money stock affect output. 
This paper accepts both rational expectations, as a theory of expecta- 
tions, and the view that “unanticipated” changes in the money stock have 
a greater impact on real output than anticipated changes in the money 
stock.  It  argues  nonetheless  that  systematic  countercyclical  monetary 
policy can affect the behavior of  output and that activist monetary policy 
should be used for that purpose. 
The argument starts by asking why  economic agents have not made 
contingent arrangements-for  example, wage rates indexed to the money 
stock or very short contracts-that  would insulate them from the effects 
of  unanticipated  changes in  the money  stock. The answer is that such 
contingent arrangements are costly; the private sector is therefore willing 
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1. While I concentrate on the same issue as Franco Modigliani in his 1977 AEA 
Presidential Address, the approach will be seen to differ from his. 
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to bear the costs imposed on it by the output deviations resulting from 
unanticipated money changes. 
The potential role for monetary policy is created by those same costs 
of  insulating the private  sector from disturbances.  The case for  active 
monetary policy is that it is more efficient for the Fed to offset aggregate 
disturbances than it is  for the private  sector to do so. The efficient di- 
vision of  labor between the private and public sectors leaves it to macro- 
economic management to deal with aggregate disturbances. 
The perspective of this paper is one that views the private and public 
sectors  as  potentially  cooperating  in  responding  to  economic  distur- 
bances; it contrasts with the view  associated  with rational expectations 
theorists that tends to regard monetary policy as working mainly through 
deception. Once the cooperative view of  policy is adopted, the relevant 
questions about the desirability of  activist monetary policy become those 
familiar from Milton Friedman’s (1960) argument for a constant growth 
rate rule: they concern the possibility that attempts to control the econ- 
omy  could  be  destabilizing  (long  and  variable  lags)  and the  alleged 
propensity of  the Fed to misbehave. 
Although  I do not  accept the policy perspective  of  much of  the ra- 
tional  expectations  literature,  this  is  not  an  attack  on  the  rational 
expectations hypothesis. The rational expectations theory of  expectations 
-that  individuals  form  expectations optimally  on  the basis  of  the  in- 
formation available to them and the costs of  using that information-has 
become and will remain the leading theory of  expectations.2  But there is 
nothing  inherent  in  the  hypothesis  that implies  that  activist policy  is 
either impossible or undesirable. 
Since the paper  ranges  widely, it is  useful  to outline the  argument. 
Given  recent  claims  about  the  ineffectiveness of  systematic  monetary 
policy, and the evidence apparently supporting such claims, I have first 
to establish that there is something to talk about. Sections 1 and 2 there- 
fore lay the groundwork for the claim that, rational expectations-oriented 
work  notwithstanding, systematic  monetary  policy  matters  for the be- 
2.  It is worth distinguishing between the “strong form” of  rational expectations, 
which assumes that individuals’ subjective probability distributions are the same as 
those  implied  by  the  models  in  which  they  are presumed  to be  agents,  and  the 
“weak form,” which is defined in the text.  (“Semi-strong” forms of  rational expec- 
tations may be defined to require that the first n moments of  subjective probability 
distributions coincide with those of  the model.) I believe that rational expectations 
in the weak form, will be the leading theory of  expectations in the same sense that 
utility theory  (or its equivalents)  is the leading theory of  consumer behavior. We 
frequently use models in which behavioral functions are not explicitly derived from 
maximization, but are uneasy in doing so, and are reassured  if it can be shown that 
the behavioral  functions  are consistent  with  maximization.  Similarly, economists 
will  continue  to  use  adaptive  and other  prespecified  models  of  expectations,  but 
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havior of  output. Assuming that claim is established, the issue of  whether 
activist  policy  should  be used  remains.  Section  3  discusses  the  de- 
sirability in principle of  activist policy; section 4 discusses activist policy 
in practice; and, finally, section 5 considers rules versus discretion. 
In more  detail, it  is  shown  in  section  1 that there  is  a variety  of 
mechanisms through which even fully anticipated monetary policy can 
affect  the  behavior  of  output.  These  mechanisms,  however,  are not 
central to the case for countercyclical monetary policy, which hinges on 
short-run considerations. 
Section 2 therefore reviews some of  the evidence that only unantici- 
pated  changes in  the  money  stock affect the behavior  of  output.  If  it 
could be established that any systematic monetary policy had no real ef- 
fect on output, then there would be little to discuss about countercyclical 
policy  except  to the  extent  that  price  level behavior  matters.  Recent 
empirical work by Barro (1978) does indeed  appear to establish that 
only unanticipated money matters for the behavior of  output, but in fact 
Barro’s results are quite consistent with the view that systematic mone- 
tary policy can be used to affect output: the crucial issue for the poten- 
tial effectiveness of  policy is whether output is affected by expectations 
that were formed before the monetary authority had to commit itself to 
a particular level of  the money stock. Results presented in the appendix 
show that if  Barro’s mechanism  of  expectations formation is accepted, 
then the data do not reject the hypothesis that two-year-ahead  forecast 
errors of  the money stock affect the behavior of  output. Since the Fed 
can clearly react to events with less than a two-year lag, Barro’s results 
do not force an end to further discussion  of  countercyclical  monetary 
policy. 
Section 2 argues that systematic monetary policy can be used to affect 
the behavior of  output. The case in principle for using activist policy is 
made in  section  3, where it is argued  that the  same factors that make 
the economy vulnerable to “unanticipated” money suggest that monetary 
policy  should  be  used  to offset  aggregate  disturbances-if  the  use  of 
active policy is not itself destabilizing. The discussion in section 4 accord- 
ingly centers on older arguments about monetary policy relating to the 
long and variable lags with which policy works and the lessons of  history. 
On the issue of  rules versus discretion, I conclude with a presumption 
in favor of  a monetary policy that leaves the Fed an important measure 
of  discretion. 
1  Equilibrium Considerations: Nonneutralities of  Anticipated Money 
Since any  systematic  monetary  policy would  eventually  come to be 
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if  anticipated changes in the money stock can affect ~utput;~  accordingly, 
the natural place  to start in considering the case for activist monetary 
policy  appears to be  with the nonneutralities of  anticipated money.  In 
this section, I will discuss the nonneutralities of  fully anticipated money, 
by which I mean changes in the money stock that are anticipated at the 
time decisions relevant to the determination of  output are made. 
The neutrality  of  money has always been a central concern of  mone- 
tary theory, precisely because it has long been obvious that money is not 
neutral. The implications of  this fact for monetary policy depend on the 
source of  the nonneutralities. Traditional  discussions of  neutrality dis- 
tinguished between the transitional effects of  a once-and-for-all  change 
in the money stock, which were generally thought to affect real variables, 
and  the  long-run  or equilibrium effects of  the  change,  which  analysis 
suggested were insubstantial.* Modern analysis has added two important 
distinctions  to  the  discussion:  (1)  that  between  the  neutrality  and 
superneutrality  of  money,  corresponding respectively  to the  effects of 
changes  in  the  stock  of  money  and growth  rate  of  money,  the  latter 
producing changes in the inflation rate; and (2) that between anticipated 
and unanticipated changes in the money stock.5 
Anticipated Inflation 
In this section we concentrate on nonneutralities of  money that arise 
from  anticipated changes in  thc money  stock  and consequent changes 
in  the expected  rate  of  inflation.  Informational  considerations are de- 
ferred to section 2. As long as money pays no interest, changes in the 
expected rate of  inflation change the expected real return from the hold- 
ing of  money,  affecting the demand for real balances, and creating the 
possibility  that  anticipated changes  in  the growth of  money affect real 
variables  .6 
3.  I shall argue below that this statement is in  important  respects misleading. A 
systematic policy, i.e., a rule that specifies money supply responses to disturbances, 
will itself eventually be anticipated, but  actual changes  in the money stock under 
such a policy may not have been  anticipated  as of  an earlier date when decisions 
relevant to the determination of  output were made. 
4.  See, for instance, Irving Fisher  1922. 
5.  Both distinctions  were at least  implicit in the older  discussions. First,  there 
was typically mention  of  the elasticity of  expectations, suggesting awareness of  the 
importance of  changes in the expected rate of  inflation. Further, the typical money 
stock  change  had people  waking in  the  morning to discover the  good news of  a 
doubling  of  their  holdings,  reflecting  awareness  also  of  the  distinction  between 
anticipated  and unanticipated  events. 
6.  Two assumptions are maintained until  further notice.  First, there are no  in- 
terest payments on money.  Second, the  government does  nothing  other  than dis- 
tribute money to the economy through transfer payments, which, however, are not 
related to individual holdings of  money by the transfer  recipients.  The second as- 215  On Activist Monetary Policy with Rational Expectations 
Consider  first  the  standard  two-period  lifetime  consumption  loans 
model in its simplest form: there is no production and each individual has 
an endowment of  a nonstorable consumption good in the first period of 
his  life;  money  is the  only vehicle for  saving. Changes in  the growth 
rate of  money affect the intergenerational allocation of  resources in such 
a model if, say, the lump sum transfers are made to the old. If  endow- 
ments varied stochastically over time, and there was a somehow agreed- 
upon social welfare function for weighting generational expected utilities, 
the government might optimally want to vary the growth rate of  money. 
But since output is exogenously determined, monetary policy obviously 
does not affect the level of  output. 
The monetary authority’s ability to affect the allocation of  resources 
depends in this case on its ability to affect the real interest rate and thus 
saving. Higher rates of  monetary expansion reduce the real interest rate 
by  raising  the expected  rate of  inflation. If  we now  allow for the in- 
clusion of  an endogenous labor  supply  (but do not yet add productive 
capital to the model), it will still be true that the monetary authority af- 
fects the real interest  rate by varying the growth rate of  money. Labor 
supply,  and thus output, will  respond to variations in  the  real  rate of 
interest. A case for activist monetary policy in a context in which there 
were variations in the productivity of  labor could once again be made, 
given a social welfare function. 
Expansion  of  the  menu  of  assets  makes  it necessary  to provide  a 
rationale for portfolio diversification, particularly the holding of  money. 
The simplest rationale lies in the existence of  some form of  transaction 
costs in buying and selling assets other than money.7 Putting money in 
the utility function will also generate portfolio diversification; this device 
is best thought of  as being justified by  the existence of  transaction costs 
that  are  not  explicitly  included  in  the  analysis,  but  rather  implicitly 
treated  as foregone utility.  A third possible  source of  diversification is 
risk  aversion, though here it is necessary to ensure that money is not a 
dominated asset. 
Sidrauski (1967) has elucidated the very strict conditions under which 
the rate of  inflation does not  affect the level of  output in a model with 
labor  and  capital  as factors  of  production  and  money  and  capital  as 
assets. Money is superneutral if  the optimizing units in the economy are 
sumption is designed to rule out, for the moment, real effects of  anticipated infla- 
tion arising from the tax system. 
7. At  this  stage  the  consumption loans  model becomes  more  difficult to  use, 
since it tends to emphasize the store of  value function of  money, while the trans- 
action costs arguments rely on  the medium of  exchange function. See Bryant  and 
Wallace  1978 for the attempted incorporation of  money in  a consumption loans 
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infinitely lived, if  the quantity of  real balances does not affect the econ- 
omy’s production  possibilities,  if  labor  is  inelastically  supplied,  and  if 
consumers have a constant discount factor for comparing utilities over 
time. The steady state capital stock is determined by the modified golden 
rule condition that the marginal product of  capital be equal to the sum 
of  the consumers’ rate of  time preference and the growth rate of  popula- 
tion. Even this set of  restrictions does not, strictly speaking, imply super- 
neutrality,  since  economic  agents  are  not  indifferent  to the  rate  of 
inflation. 
Relaxation of  the specified conditions will again produce nonneutrali- 
ties of  anticipated money. If  labor supply is not exogenously fixed (Brock 
1974), or  if  consumers  do not  effectively  maximize  over  an infinite 
horizon  (Drazen  1976), or if  money  enters  the production  function, 
money will  not  be superneutral.  Nor  does the superneutrality apply to 
the behavior of  the economy before the steady state is reached (Fischer 
1979~);  more rapid rates of  money growth tend to produce more rapid 
rates of  accumulation  of  physical capital in the transition to the steady 
state. 
Once there is  a rationale for the holding of  money, expansion of the 
menu of  assets, held on grounds of  risk aversion, introduces no funda- 
mentally  new issues. It is therefore useful to step back to examine the 
two basic mechanisms at work rather than continue to catalog possible 
nonneutralities.  The  first  mechanism  arises  from  the  possibility  that 
changes in the real return on holding money affect interest rates on other 
assets, thus portfolio composition,  and possibly the rate of  saving and 
labor supply.  The second mechanism operates through the effect of  an 
increase in the expected inflation rate on the level of  real balances. Lower 
real balances may imply more transactions and less resources available 
for  production;  they  may  also produce  wealth  effects that  will  affect 
spending on goods and services and labor supply. 
The  empirical  significance of  these  mechanisms  is  not  known.  But 
there is a priori reason to think the effects will be small. First, they do 
not all work in the same direction: the accumulation of  physical assets 
induced  by  anticipated inflation  tends to increase output, whereas  the 
diversion of  resources from  the production of  goods to the production 
of transactions tends to reduce final output. Second, the base on which 
the real balance effect works is small; the stock of  non-interest-bearing 
money is less than MI, since some implicit interest is paid  on demand 
deposits.8 Further, it is likely that explicit interest payments on demand 
deposits will soon become legal, leaving currency as the only non-interest- 
bearing nominal asset. 
8. Startz (1978) estimates the implicit rate to  be half the competitive rate. 217  On Activist Monetary Policy with Rational Expectations 
Institutional Effects of  Anticipated Inflation 
Up to this point, we have confined the government to making lump 
sum transfer  payments in  determining the growth  rate  of  money.  We 
want now briefly to consider the real effects of  anticipated inflation aris- 
ing from the nature of  the tax system and other government regulations. 
There is first the inflation tax itself.  Changes in the growth  rate of 
money affect the real revenue the government obtains from the creation 
of  high-powered money and make it possible to vary other taxes, given 
the level of  government spending. Changes in the pattern of  taxation will 
have real effects, though little more definite can be said without consider- 
ing the details of  the tax structure. 
The primary  nonneutralities of  the tax system arise, however,  from 
nonindexation of  taxes. The major effects will arise from the payment of 
taxes on nominal, rather than real, interest  (combined with differential 
rates of  personal and corporate taxation), and from the use of  historical 
cost  as the basis  for  depreciati~n.~  Each  of  these features  of  the tax 
system implies that increases in the anticipated rate of  inflation would 
discourage  capital  accumulation.  Similarly,  despite  changes  in  the 
method of  financing housing investment in the last few years, anticipated 
inflation still has potentially large effects in reducing the volume of  hous- 
ing investment;1° the effects may be  attributed  in  part to the existence 
of  government-imposed interest ceilings. 
It is worth noting that the specified characteristics of  the tax system 
and housing financing are part of  the institutional setting of  the economy 
that has  not  completely  adapted to the existence of  ongoing inflation. 
Their  existence  thus cannot  be relied  on  as a  permanent  mechanism 
through which monetary policy will affect the economy. It is significant, 
however, that the institutional features  remain  at least partly in place 
after twelve or more years of  continuing inflation. The costs of  changing 
the institutions of  an economy that are based on an implicit assumption 
of  the stability of  the value of  money to those that are based on the rec- 
ognition of  ongoing inflation must be substantial. 
The institutional  nonneutralities  discussed  above  tend  to make  in- 
creases in the anticipated rate of  inflation reduce the rate of  investment 
and subsequent output. The net effect of  anticipated changes in money on 
output in the current and subsequent periods is thus difficult to predict a 
priori; it will also probably be a delicate matter empirically to isolate the 
magnitude of  the mechanisms discussed in this section. One place to start 
is by  examining the effects of  anticipated changes in money on the real 
9. These effects have been emphasized by Feldstein and others; see, for instance, 
10.  Details are contained in Modigliani and Lessard  1975. 
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interest rate. In the next section we  also discuss reduced form estimates 
of  the effects of  anticipated money on output. 
But even if reliable estimates turned out to show that the nonneutrali- 
ties of  anticipated money are not trivial, it would still remain to make 
the theoretical case for the desirability of  activist monetary policy. An 
initial reaction might be that the factors discussed in this section merely 
suggest that the growth rate of  money should be set at that level which 
would produce the optimal quantity of  money’l  and the economy other- 
wise left free of  monetary interference. However, in a context in which 
there are other distorting taxes, the inflation tax should also in general 
be used to raise revenue. Nor, even ignoring the inflation tax, is the opti- 
mal  quantity of  money provided by keeping the growth rate of  money 
constant if  the marginal product  of  capital varies over time. The argu- 
ment for an activist monetary policy would thus be derived from analysis 
of the optimal inflation tax: as government expenditure varies, and other 
disturbances impinge on the economy, the optimal use of the inflation tax 
would also change. The optimal growth rate of  money would therefore 
change as the state of  the economy changed. 
There are three main  conclusions  from this section. First, there are 
sound  theoretical  reasons  for  thinking  that  anticipated  money  is  not 
necessarily neutral. Second, we  do not at present have empirical knowl- 
edge of  the net  direction and magnitude of  the mechanisms underlying 
the neutralities. Third, there is no reason to think that an optimal mone- 
tary policy derived in a model in which nonneutralities are present, and 
in which revenue from the inflation tax accrues to the government, will 
be a constant growth rate rule. Put differently, considerations of  the type 
discussed in this section do not attach any sanctity to the constant growth 
rate of  money. 
A fourth conclusion should also be drawn:  While the nonneutralities 
of  this section may eventually be important in designing a framework for 
monetary  and fiscal policy,  they  are not  of  central importance  to the 
debate over countercyclical  monetary  policy. We therefore turn to the 
nonneutralities of  unanticipated money. 
2  Nonneutralities of  Unanticipated Money 
Emphasis by Lucas  (1973) and others on the importance of  the un- 
anticipated component of  the change in the price level has led to empiri- 
cal work, of  which the best known is by Barro (1977a, 1978),  which ap- 
11. Friedman  (1969) suggests that the optimum quantity of  money obtains when 
the economy  is  satiated with  real  balances;  this  requires  that  money  pay  a  real 
return equal to “the” real interest rate on other assets. The positive real return on 
money  is achieved by producing deflation. 219  On Activist Monetary Policy with Rational Expectations 
pears to show that only unanticipated changes in the money stock affect 
real output and that anticipated changes in money have no real effects. 
A finding that only unanticipated money affects the behavior of  output 
would be significant for the conduct of  monetary policy, though not de- 
cisive in establishing the desirability of  a constant growth rate rule. The 
case for activist policy would then have to rest on the effects of  the policy 
on the natural level of  output and on its implications for price level be- 
havior. The welfare case for a monetary policy that operates by surprise 
or deception  appears to be a difficult one to make,  so that the strong 
Barro position that only unanticipated money works would tend to sup- 
port rules over discretion. 
For the purposes of  this paper, I want  to show that Barro’s results 
are not inconsistent  with the view that systematic monetary policy can 
affect the behavior  of  output. I therefore  do not have to enter into a 
detailed argument about the real meaning of  Barro’s results or even into 
the question of  whether he has successfully measured expectations of  the 
growth  rate of  money12 though  fundamental  criticisms  will  doubtless 
center on this latter issue. 
The key point in my argument is that anticipations of  money growth 
for periods other than one year ahead (Barro uses annual data) are rele- 
vant to the determination of  output. I believe that, to a useful first ap- 
proximation, the long-run Phillips curve is vertical. That means that fully 
anticipated changes in the money stock would not affect unemployment 
significantly. But one can hardly imagine a change in the money stock 
that has always been anticipated: every change in the money stock must 
be unanticipated as of  some earlier date. If  the Fed can respond to dis- 
turbances occurring after decisions relevant to the determination of  out- 
put are made, then it can systematically affect the behavior of  output.13 
The Barro Output Equation 
I review Barro’s procedure briefly in the text; more detail is provided 
in the appendix. Unemployment, or the deviation of  output from trend, 
is explained in a regression using annual data with actual and unantici- 
pated changes in the money stock as regressors. A single stable money 
supply rule was estimated and taken to have been used in forming ex- 
pectations, based on information available one year ahead, of  monetary 
12.  David Germany (1978) points out that the restrictions Barro needs to iden- 
tify the coefficients on unanticipated money in his output equation are literally in- 
credible:  it  is  assumed that  expectations are  known  (by  the  output  regression 
runner)  exactly. 
13. This point is  worked out in  Fischer 1977~.  That article implicitly accepted 
the view that  systematic monetary policy would be used to “deceive” the private 
sector, rather than the view of the present paper that systematic policy can be used 
to produce desirable outcomes more cheaply than is possible with a passive policy. 220  Stanley Fischer 
growth over the period.14 Barro finds that unanticipated increases in the 
growth  rate  of  money  significantly  increase  the  level  of  output;  the 
hypothesis that anticipated changes in money also affect the behavior of 
output is not accepted. 
A relevant question about Barro’s results from the viewpoint of  activist 
policy concerns the time interval over which “unanticipated” is defined. 
In  an earlier  paper  (1977)  I  argued  that  anticipations of  the price 
level  more  than  one  period  ahead  might  enter  the  output  equation. 
Analogously, it is possible that expectations of  the money supply formed 
two periods back, rather than one period  back, could enter the output 
equation. 
Using Barro’s money supply equation, I have constructed two-period 
ahead forecast errors for the money stock and included them in the out- 
put equation.  (Details are in the appendix.) As would be expected, the 
two-period foredast errors are collinear-though  not perfectly so-with 
the separate one-period forecast errors over the same two years. The in- 
clusion of  a two-period  ahead forecast error in the output equation re- 
duces the standard error in that equation, but not significantly so. Re- 
placing the first one-period ahead forecast errors with a two-period error 
reduces the standard error of  estimate, though not  significantly. I con- 
clude that the data cannot tell us whether  only one-year  ahead or only 
two-year  ahead  errors in  predicting  money,  or both, contribute to ex- 
plaining  the behavior  of  output-though  if  forced  to choose,  the data 
choose the  two-period  forecast  error. My  belief  is  that both types  of 
forecast error are relevant; there is nothing in the Barro data to reject 
that view. 
The reason the inclusion of  the two-period ahead error matters is that 
it is very hard  to argue that the Fed  cannot use a monetary  rule that 
reacts within a period of  two years to new information. If  the two-year 
expectation is  somehow  locked  in  (for  example,  in  labor  contracts), 
then  the Fed has  ample  time  to act to affect the behavior of  output. 
That does not mean it should  act, but rather that it can systematically 
affect output. Moving in the other direction, though, it is also difficult to 
believe that the Fed  cannot within the period  of  a year  systematically 
react  to information  that  becomes  available  to  it,  after  the one-year 
ahead expectations are locked in. That is, the length of  the Barro period 
suggests that the Fed can systematically produce unanticipated money- 
by acting on information that becomes available within the year.15 
14. In an earlier version of his 1977a paper, Barro showed that his results were 
not significantly affected if  a money  supply equation based only on data available 
up  to the  time  an expectation  was  formed  was  used  in  generating the  expected 
change in money. 
15. It is, of course, true that whether or not the Fed can systematically produce 
unanticipated money depends on private sector contracting arrangements; I return 
to  this point below. 221  On Activist Monetary Policy with Rational Expectations 
This possibility raises the familiar mutual causation question, as a po- 
tential explanation for the  apparent strength of  the effects of  unantici- 
pated money. It is somewhat surprising that Barro finds a stable money 
supply process over a period during which the Fed moved from a policy 
of  supporting interest rates to one in which it claims to pay attention to 
monetary targets; it is also surprising that there is no apparent role for 
interest rates in Barro’s equation.16 His results might reflect the effects on 
both money and output of  movements of  other variables that tend to in- 
crease output, with the Fed increasing money to smooth interest rates1’ 
The Lucas Supply Function 
Given the uncertainties raised in the preceding paragraphs, it would be 
useful  in  judging  the  importance  of  Barro’s  results  to  know  what 
mechanism  might  have  produced  them  if  they were  true.  The impact 
of  an unanticipated  increase in the growth rate of  money by one per- 
centage point produces an increase in output of  over 1% in the current 
year, and nearly 1.2%  in the following year. The Fed rolls high-powered 
dice. 
There  are two  competing explanations for results of  the type Barro 
has obtained. The first is the standard rational  expectations supply hy- 
pothesis, which will be detailed below. The second is a Keynesian story, 
which attributes Barro’s results to the stickiness of  wages that are based 
on expected prices.l8 The first  explanation tends to rule out a role for 
active policy, while the second does not. The Phillips curve is an impli- 
cation of  both stories and cannot be used to distinguish between them.lg 
In this section I discuss the Lucas  supply hypothesis to see whether 
there is independent evidence suggesting that it underlies Barro’s reduced 
form results. The Lucas supply function is: 
(1) 
where y is the level of  output, yn is the natural or full employment level 
of  output, and P  is the price level, each in logarithms; e is a disturbance 
term, and the notation t-IPt denotes the expectation of  Pt that is formed 
yt =  ynt +  b(Pt -  t-lPt) +  et, 
16.  See the comments  on  Barro’s  paper  (chap.  2)  in  this  volume  by  Robert 
Weintr aub  . 
17.  Preliminary  evidence  indicates  that  unanticipated  increases  in  money  (as 
measured by Barro) are positively correlated with unanticipated increases in short- 
term interest rates (the expected interest rate is calculated from the term structure), 
providing some support to the notion that increases in the demand for money partly 
produce unanticipated money. 
18.  Backward looking “catch-up” elements are also typically found  empirically 
in the  Phillips curve; Taylor  1979 has a model  with  overlapping  labor contracts 
in which workers are concerned  with relative wages, which is consistent with esti- 
mated  Phillips curves. 
19.  I am grateful to Robert Hall for emphasizing this point. 222  Stanley Fischer 
on the basis of  information available at time (t -  1  ) .  The Lucas analysis 
is most  accessibly developed  in  his  1973 article; the  rationale for  (1) 
builds  on  information confusions,  which  cause individuals  to increase 
their supply of output when nominal prices increase, under the mistaken 
impression that the relative price of  their output has risen. 
The key element in the Lucas mechanism is the increase in the supply 
of  output in response to a rise in the perceived relative price, a story that 
is most  naturally  told  as the model  of  an individual  supplier  of labor 
services, for whom the price of output is the nominal wage. Lucas (1977) 
notes, however, a very similar mechanism would operate in the case of 
firms. The strength of  the mechanism would be greatest  in response to 
an increase in the perceived real wage that was thought to be temporary, 
for in that case workers would  like to increase the amount they work 
in the current period  (at a high wage)  and substitute more leisure next 
period (when the wage is expected to be lower than its current level). An 
increase in the real wage that is expected to be permanent might not elicit 
any  increase  in  output,  since  labor  supply  curves  may  even  slope 
backward. 
Doubts  can  be  raised  about  the  supply  mechanism  (1). First,  as 
David Small  (1977) has pointed out, the assumed reaction of  workers 
to an increase in the current price level requires it to signal an increase 
(or at least not a large decrease)  in the real interest rate; in a model in 
which  monetary  growth  affects the  real  interest rate,  monetary  policy 
can negate the labor supply response to unanticipated inflation.20  Second, 
the  mechanism  provides  no real explanation of  a relationship between 
unanticipated inflation and the unemployment rate-it  appears that those 
who choose not to work when the perceived real wage falls would not be 
unemployed.  Perhaps,  however,  the  existence  of  unemployment  insur- 
ance makes it profitable to appear to be unemployed even when workers 
desire to reduce the amount they work; in  addition, movements in the 
participation rate, as in Sargent ( 1976a), might help explain movements 
in  the  unemployment  rate.  Third,  if  this  mechanism  were  powerful, 
temporary income tax changes would be potent instruments for affecting 
the pattern  of  output  over  time-and  there  is  little  evidence  of  such 
potency.  Fourth,  given  the  crucial  importance  of  the  mechanism, the 
empirical support for it is small.21 
Unanticipated Money and Sticky Prices 
The evidence supporting the Lucas supply hypothesis is hardly strong 
enough  to justify  the  view  that  it  is  the  main  mechanism  underlying 
20.  Bulow and Polemarchakis  ( 1978) have studied essentially  this mechanism. 
21.  Lucas refers to his work with Rapping (1969), to work by Ghez and Becker 
(19751, and some more casual evidence. The Ghez and  Becker evidence does not 
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Barro’s empirical results. Indeed, Barro’s (  1978) price equation reveals 
some stickiness of  the aggregate price level, leading him to remark that 
the money-to-price link may be too weak to explain the estimated effects 
of  unanticipated money on output.22 
The stickiness of prices suggests that a Keynesian mechanism, in which 
changes in money affect aggregate demand, which  affects employment, 
may  be  at work.  The response  of  some  prices,  particularly  wages, to 
changes in demand is sluggish relative to the period  over which policy 
is form~lated;~~  Sargent (1976~)  finds that wage rates may be treated as 
exogenous in  a quarterly macro model. The most plausible generaliza- 
tion of  the Lucas supply function is probably this: the longer in advance 
a  given  type  of  change  in  the  money  supply  has  been  expected,  the 
greater  the  effect  on  prices  relative to the effect  on  output, with  the 
effects being proximately  attributed to the stickiness of  nominal prices 
fixed over different horizons.24 
In the short run  (maybe several years)  in which prices  are sticky, 
monetary policy  can  affect the behavior  of  output  in  the manner  sug- 
gested by Keynesian disequilibrium analysis, in which quantities are not 
necessarily determined at the intersections of  supply and demand curves. 
There is no presumption that any intervention can only worsen the situ- 
ation in such  circumstance^.^^ 
The conclusions from this section are that there is no strong evidence 
for the view that only unanticipated  (with a one-year horizon) changes 
in the money stock affect output. The data are not strong enough to force 
acceptance of  the view that it is one year ahead rather than longer or 
shorter  forecast  errors  that  are  relevant  to  the  behavior  of  output. 
Similarly,  while  there  is  some  evidence  supporting  the  Lucas  supply 
mechanism, there is also evidence for price stickiness. 
We are now free to discuss activist policy. 
22.  Since interest rates are held constant in Barro’s price equation, a more com- 
plete analysis might reverse, or for that matter, strengthen, this conclusion. 
23.  Poole  (1976) argues that there is some period  short enough that the  price 
adjustments assumed in the equilibrium supply framework do not operate. 
24.  This comment  applies to the  extent  that money  is  neutral,  price  stickiness 
aside. In Fischer  19796 I show that when  anticipated money affects output, prices 
may rise less the longer a given change in money has been expected-because  the 
anticipated  money  then  affects output more. 
Taylor’s  1979 model  produces  an  adjustment  pattern  like  that  referred  to  in 
the text. 
25.  It can and has been objected to the view that short-run price  stickiness im- 
plies that output  is  not  optimally determined  and  can  be  predictably  affected by 
monetary policy,  that the  private  sector would  not  enter  into  arrangements  that 
would “predictably” imply a deadweight loss  (Barro, 19776). By  the  same token, 
the private sector would presumably  not enter into arrangements that leave it vul- 
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3  The Desirability in Principle of  Activist Policy 
The classical argument for government control of  the money  supply 
is  that  a  fiat  money  system  is  unstable,  tending  to degenerate  into  a 
commodity  money  system.  Historically,  central  banking  developed  in 
response to a slightly different instability: that of  a financial system in 
which the quantity of  claims on the existing stock of  commodity money 
was larger than that stock. The Bank of England, for instance, was driven 
against its will to manage the London money markets by financial crises 
that  threatened  private  sector  financial  institutions  (Bagehot  1906, 
Sayers 1957). The private sector can manage financial panics,26  but the 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century record indicates that better man- 
agement  should  not be  difficult-though  the  Great  Depression  proves 
that worse management is also possible.27 
At a general level, we can agree that if  the government is to control the 
money supply, it should provide  a stable monetary  background against 
which the economy can proceed with its real business of  producing and 
consuming goods. If  there were no disturbances to money demand, aris- 
ing from disturbances affecting the level of  output or interest rates, or 
the random term in the demand function, a stable monetary background 
would be  a stable  (predictable)  money supply. A constant growth rate 
rule would serve well. 
But there are, of  course, disturbances to money demand. In the long 
run these take the form of  changes in the assets that constitute money. 
Historically, the process  has been  one of  a broadening of  the class of 
assets that serve as the medium  of  exchange. Price level behavior over 
the long term would become less and less predictable if  monetary policy 
were devoted to control of  the supply of  an asset that constituted a de- 
creasing proportion  of  the  money  supply. We therefore  cannot  expect 
that  a  constant  growth  rate  rule,  or  for  that matter  any  other  rule, 
would remain inviolate over the long term; occasions would arise when 
it would be necessary to change the asset whose growth rate was being 
controlled.2s  Such changes hardly constitute activism, however. 
The General Rationale for Countercyclical Monetary Policy 
The important issues arise in the short run. Short-run disturbances to 
money  demand  arise both  from  goods market disturbances that  affect 
the  level of  income  and  the  interest  rate  and  from  random  shifts  in 
26.  Friedman  and Schwartz  (1963) suggest that the private  sector would  have 
handled what became the Great Depression better than the Fed had the latter not 
existed. 
27.  I assume that enough has been learned  (and that institutions have changed) 
so that the Fed would not again act as it did in the early 1930s. 
28.  The 100% money plan would have difficulty in controlling the development 
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money demand; the money demand function does not fit perfectly even 
for the sample period  1955-73.  The evidence reviewed in section 2 sug- 
gests that by reacting to these disturbances, the Fed can affect the subse- 
quent behavior  of  output, interest  rates,  and prices,  even if  the policy 
actions  constitute  a  regular pattern of  behavior  and  are in  that sense 
anticipated. 
I shall also argue that it is at least potentially desirable that the Fed 
seek to offset disturbances. The argument most usefully starts from the 
recognition that there would be no reason for disequilibria to emerge as 
a result of  monetary disturbances in the absence of  transactions and in- 
formation costs. In the  absence of  such costs, the private sector would 
closely monitor the aggregate price level and aggregate money stock and 
make contracts contingent on them. Unanticipated money-or  any other 
disturbance-would  create disequilibrium,  or an unsatisfactory state of 
affairs, for only as long as the arbitrarily short period over which prices 
and wages were fixed. There is, of  course, noise in both price and money 
data, but some information is better than none. 
It  might  be  suggested  that  the  private  sector  does  not  enter  into 
complicated  arrangements  contingent  on  aggregate  variables  because 
aggregate fluctuations  account for only  a small part of  the risk facing 
individual economic units. Such an argument is both correct and incom- 
plete;  it  has  to be  combined  with  the  obvious  assumption that there 
are costs  of  acquiring and  processing  information,  of  writing detailed 
contingent contracts, and of  reducing the length of  contract periods, if  it 
is to account for the nonexistence of  the contracts that would render the 
private sector immune to aggregate disturbances. 
The costs that prevent the private sector from insulating itself against 
aggregate disturbances lead also to temporarily sticky prices that produce 
the presumption that private sector output is not continuously optimal. 
Those  costs  are  the  underlying  reason  there  is  a  potential  role  for 
activist monetary policy in attempting to off set aggregate disturbances. 
If  one takes the view that monetary management has the task of  off- 
setting aggregate disturbances that the private sector has not made ar- 
rangements  to deal with,  the  goals  of  policy  are the  standard ones of 
full employment  (minimizing the  deviations of  the unemployment rate 
from the natural rate) and price ~tability.~~  Price stability is desirable in 
part for the reasons emphasized in the Lucas supply mechanism: it en- 
ables the price  system to operate more effi~iently.~~  But this cannot be 
29.  This  sentence  glides  over  some  difficult  issues,  particularly in  relation  to 
price stability versus price predictability. 
30.  It has, of course, been recognized that a desire for price level stability would 
support an activist monetary policy even if  anticipated money did not affect output 
(Sargent and Wallace  1975). But it  is important to realize that price level predict- 
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the full explanation for the weight that inflation aversion has in public 
opinion polls."l 
To say that monetary policy should have worthwhile goals is hardly 
a policy prescription. Detailed  prescription  cannot be expected  from a 
paper that does not present an empirical model as a basis for prescrip- 
tion, though I do in the next two sections discuss general characteristics 
of desirable monetary policy. In principle, the optimal monetary policy 
to be used for stabilization can be studied using an appropriately speci- 
fied macroeconometric model,  which  pays  due  attention  to  the effects 
of changes in policy regime on the structure of  the  Such models 
are not inherently impossible to  build. 
4  Activist Policy in Practice 
There is no inconsistency in accepting the general argument of  section 
3 for activist policy and in urging the immediate acceptance of  a constant 
growth rate rule (CGRR) .  After all, we do not know the optimal activist 
policy. In this section I concentrate on a comparison  among a number 
of monetary policies, leaving the rules versus discretion issue to section 5. 
The first  policy  is  the  most  difficult  to  describe:  it  is  the  current 
system, in which the Fed makes monetary policy as best it can, with input 
from business, academic, and other sources of  pressure, and in ways that 
change over time. The second is the constant growth rate policy (CGRP) 
or a passive policy. Most studies of  alternative monetary policies have 
compared these two, with  history  serving as the representation of  Fed 
policy. Third I will  consider a policy  that is intermediate between the 
back rules.  The predictability  at issue  is that of  prices in  the more distant future. 
In a number of  models,  the  one-period  ahead variance  of  the price  level  is  the 
same whatever the monetary rule that is being followed. But the uncertainty today 
about the level of  prices in the distant future in general is greater if  monetary pol- 
icy  does not respond  to current  disturbances  than  if  it  does  attempt  to stabilize 
prices. To the extent that price level predictability more than one period  ahead is 
relevant  to the allocation  of  resources,  activist  monetary  policy  might  be  desir- 
able on those grounds alone. 
31.  Fischer  and Modigliani  (1979) list  many of  the real effects of  inflation  on 
the economy;  these  may in part  account for popular  attitudes to inflation,  which 
are frequently ascribed to  irrationality. 
32. The warning in Lucas  1976 that the  structure of  econometric  models will 
not remain invariant to policy  changes applies also to the  structure of  contracts. 
The monetary policy of  the last three decades has, by some accounts, been largely 
in error but the private sector has allowed  itself  to be left in the position where, 
by some estimates, a  1%  unanticipated  change in the money supply affects output 
by 1% within a year, and more the next year. If  monetary policy were to improve, 
the private sector would make itself more vulnerable to the effects of unanticipated 
money, by  adopting longer-term  contracts and paying  less  attention to monetary 
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first two-one  in which policy is basically passive except in the face of 
major actual or anticipated disturbances. 
The major  arguments for CGRP as compared with actual policy are 
familiar from earlier discussions: they are that ignorance of  the structure 
of  the  economy  makes  policy  intervention  destabilizing  (“long  and 
variable lags”) ;  that most serious disturbances have been caused by inept 
policies; and that political pressures lead to monetary  mismanagement. 
Underlying these arguments is an interpretation of  the historical record 
that claims the Great Depression would have been more moderate had 
the Fed  followed a CGRP  (Friedman and  Schwartz,  1963)  and  that 
macroeconomic behavior in a number of  subsequent episodes would like- 
wise have been better had the Fed been following such a policy (Fried- 
man, 1960)  .33 
At the theoretical  level it is correct that increased uncertainty about 
the structure of  the economy supports the use of  more passive policies. 
Similarly,  it  is  entirely  possible  for  naive  policies to  be  destabilizing. 
Whether ignorance and naivete have in practice caused policy to be de- 
stabilizing and will do so in the future are difficult questions to answer. 
The historical record, to which we turn shortly, casts some light on these 
questions. 
Before we  examine the record, though,  we  have to ask whether  the 
entire  post-1 9  13 history  of  the  Fed, including  the  Great  Depression, 
should be thrown into the scales, or whether it is reasonable to assume 
the Fed has learned something. As previously noted, I will proceed on 
the assumptions that the Fed can and has learned from history and that 
deposit  insurance,  memory,  and  the  persuasive  evidence  of  Friedman 
and Schwartz, will prevent a repetition of  the behavior of  the monetary 
authority during the early 1930s. Similarly, I believe that the Fed is now 
more aware of  the potentially destabilizing influence of  stabilizing nomi- 
nal interest rates than it was in the sixties and that it pays more atten- 
tion to the behavior of  the monetary aggregates than it did.34 
The Historical Record 
The record of  monetary policy up to 1960 was studied by Friedman 
(1960), who emphasized the debacle of  the Great Depression  and  re- 
garded post-World  War I1  monetary policy as less obviously defective 
The evaluation of  monetary policy in the post-World  War I1 period 
(or in  any  other  period)  presents  substantial difficulties. The natural 
33. Poole’s contribution to this volume makes that claim for the 1971-75  period. 
34.  The  need for this paragraph may not  be  obvious to all  readers. However, 
some comments on the first  draft of this paper persuaded me that the question of 
whether  the monetary authority has  learned  anything is  central to disagreements 
about CGRP. 
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way to proceed  appears to be to use an econometric model to compare 
the historical performance of  the economy with that which would have 
occurred under CGRP. Such experiments typically show actual monetary 
policy outperforming, or not being markedly worse than, a passive policy 
(for example, Modigliani  1977, Eckstein  1  97835). Unfortunately these 
experiments are subject to the reservations emphasized by Lucas (1976) 
in his discussion of  econometric policy evaluation. 
The other method  of  evaluating  policy is less formal.  It is to select 
particular  episodes for  discussion,  criticism,  and  comparison  with  the 
results  of  a passive policy. For instance,  it is reasonably clear that the 
growth rate of  money was too high in  1968 and early  1969 and that a 
policy that maintained the growth rate of  money at, say, the average rate 
of  the sixties would have been better. 
Similarly,  Poole  provides  an  interesting evaluation  of  the  197  1-75 
period  (see chap.  9). Poole argues  convincingly that monetary policy 
was too expansionary in 1971-72,  especially given the existence of  wage 
and price controls.  He also suggests that more expansionary monetary 
policy in the first half  of  1974-as  urged  at the time by, for instance, 
Modigliani  (  1974)-would  have produced  substantially more inflation 
but  little more output than  actually occurred. He argues, interestingly, 
that the Fed could not really have followed a more expansionary policy 
in the first half  of  1974 because such a policy would not have looked 
right at  a time  of  high  inflation  and  relatively low unemployment. He 
absolves the fall in  monetary growth  in  the  second half  of  1974 from 
most of  the blame for the recession. And he argues for a constant growth 
rate rule. 
Although exercises of  this type are subject to both the Lucas critique 
and  selection bias, the argument  is  sufficiently interesting to be worth 
pursuing. The initial appearance is that Poole’s analysis does not support 
the case for CGRP. The implication  of  Poole’s argument is that mone- 
tary growth should have been reduced below the trend rate in  1971-72 
to accompany wage and price controls, and it should have been increased 
above its  trend  level  in  the  second  half  of  1974. (Poole seems to be 
agnostic about the first half of  1974.) If  political forces indeed restrained 
monetary growth in the first half of  1974, then one of  the major argu- 
ments for rules-that  they  remove  the Fed from unfortunate political 
pressures-appears  redundant. 
However, there is  more to be  said in defense of  CGRP. In the first 
place, although optimal policy in  1971-72  would not have been CGRP, 
the latter would have been  better than actual policy. And  second, it is 
35. Eckstein’s passive policy  controls  the  growth  rate  of  unborrowed  reserves 
rather than M1. The growth rate of money  under such a policy is not much more 
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open to proponents  of  CGRP to argue that there would have been no 
need for wage-price controls in  1971 if the rule had been in effect in the 
sixties. 
Although Lucas’s critique of  econometric policy evaluation makes any 
statements about the historical record difficult to support strongly at this 
stage, the following remarks are in order. First, monetary policy in the 
post-World  War I1 period has not on average been markedly worse than 
a constant growth  rate  rule,  and has probably  been  somewhat better. 
Second, it is easy to find particular episodes for which one can confidently 
assert that  actual policy was worse than a constant growth rate policy. 
Third, we can on general grounds be sure that a 4% growth rule would 
have produced a lower inflation rate between  1960 and the present than 
actually occurred. But without  an econometric model, we do not know 
whether  overall  economic performance-including  the behavior of  the 
unemployment  rate-would  have been better under such a policy. 
The historical  record since World War I1 does not tell the unambigu- 
ous story that proponents of  CGRP find in it, even though there are epi- 
sodes in which CGRP would have been better than actual policy. 
Modified Activist Policy 
The arguments against activist policy outlined in this section, and the 
evolution of  actual policy, point in the same direction-toward  a policy 
that responds  very  little  or not  at all  to minor  actual and prospective 
disturbances, but with proportionately  more vigor to actual and poten- 
tial major disturbances. For want of  a better term, I shall refer to this 
policy as modified activist policy, or MAP. 
The arguments made by  Friedman  against  activist  policy are telling 
against fine tuning: given uncertainty about the structure of  the economy, 
policy has to be cautious in reacting to information contained in minor 
disturbances, in  part  because  data revisions  are often  large.  However, 
there is  no reason  why policy  should not react to major  disturbances, 
actual or prospective,  when  it is clear that either expansionary or con- 
tractionary policy is required.36 In saying this, I assume that major dis- 
turbances  could occur  even in  the absence  of  government  policy:  the 
nineteenth-  and early twentieth-century record suggests that possibility. 
If  it should be the case that large disturbances have been the fault of  the 
Fed, the absence or mildness of fine tuning would soon establish itself as 
a  major  success-unless  political  pressures make it  impossible to run 
a cautious policy. 
The discussion of the three policies of  this section can conveniently be 
continued in the next section, under the heading of  rules versus discre- 
36.  The monetary policy required in the case of  a demand disturbance  is usually 
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tion.  In practice, a monetary rule would almost certainly be written as 
a constant growth rate rule,  and discretion would mean continuance of 
the present evolving system of  monetary control. In operation, a mone- 
tary rule would be much like MAP, for the rule would likely be adapted 
or changed in response to an anticipated or actual crisis. 
5  Rules versus Discretion 
The general issue of rules versus discretion in monetary policy amounts 
to the question of  whether the Fed should be given a narrowly  defined 
task by legislation specifying the behavior of  variables fairly directly un- 
der  its  control  (rules), or  alternatively,  should  be  left  to decide  the 
appropriate  means  of  achieving  ultimate  targets  of  monetary  policy 
(price stability,  full employment, etc.)  specified by legislation  (discre- 
tion). As with  most  convenient  distinctions,  there is no hard  and  fast 
line:  a  rule  that  would  leave  the  Fed  with  a  minimum  of  discretion 
would prescribe  the behavior of  its own portfolio; the current situation 
in  which various ultimate targets  are mentioned  in  legislation,  but the 
appropriate weights and the means of  reaching those goals are not, gives 
the Fed a much larger measure of  discretion. For convenience, we can 
draw the line between legislation that controls the behavior of  a mone- 
tary  aggregate  (or several  aggregates)  as being  a  rule  and legislation 
that  prescribes  the  goals  of  stabilization policy  without  specifying the 
behavior of  monetary aggregates as providing di~cretion.~~ 
Any monetary rule would have to be amended as the financial system 
evolved, as we have already noted. Changes in the rule might also have 
to be made in the short run, if  it proved defective in operation. Indeed, 
the  proposal  for  a  monetary  rule  is  equivalent  to the  suggestion that 
monetary policy be subject to the same legislative process as tax changes 
unless  it is  seriously suggested that  the  rule  be  embodied  in  a consti- 
tutional amendment. The latter  suggestion reflects excessive confidence 
(or hubris)  in conclusions reached on the issues discussed in section 4. 
Two complementary methods for changing the monetary rule suggest 
themselves.  First,  there  could  be  hearings  on the  performance  of  the 
rule  at fixed  intervals:  the  Fed  might be  required  to  report  regularly 
on  the  workings  of  monetary  policy  and  make  recommendations  for 
changes. Second, changes could be proposed as the Congress or the Fed 
or any other agency saw the need. 
37.  On this definition,  Henry Simons (1952) argued for discretion in the 1930s; 
his proposed monetary rule was that the Fed aim to achieve price stability. At the 
time he was concerned about the instability of  the demand for money.  He argued 
that an optimal system would have 100% money and a fixed amount of  it, and he 
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The Case for Discretion 
The benefit of  discretion, or leaving monetary policy in the hands of 
the Fed, is flexibility. There are two aspects of  flexibility. The first re- 
lates to the classic lender of  last resort function of  the central bank, in 
which  flexibility  enables  the  central  bank  to  intervene  in  potential 
financial  crises. Such intervention was useful  in the Penn Central and 
Franklin National cases, even if  the methods of  intervention in the latter 
case  were  not optimal.  In neither  of  these  cases,  though, did it seem 
that there was any threat of  a run on high-powered money, and it may 
be that the advent of  the FDIC has indeed removed the need for a lender 
of  last resort. Further, a rule that fixes the growth rate of  M1 would pro- 
vide an element of  built-in stabilization since increases in the demand for 
currency at the expense of  demand  deposits would  be accommodated 
automatically.  But  the basic  source  of  the  instability  that  underlies  a 
panic-the  multiple  expansion  of  credit-would  not  be  removed  by 
CGRR. 
There is thus no certainty that panics would be avoided under CGRR 
and accordingly it is important that there be some agency in a position 
to deal with potential panics in the financial markets. The most natural 
agency for this purpose would be the Fed, which should have left open 
to it the possibility of  discounting freely  and/or  conducting large-scale 
open market operations. 
The second type of  flexibility is that which permits the Fed to react to 
business  cycle developments.  The argument  here would  be  that  there 
might be  business  cycle  developments  to which  the Fed  should react 
and that  the details  are too subtle to spell out in legislation. If  a rule 
were in operation, the Fed could  ask the Congress for authorization to 
engage in extraordinary measures if  the need were foreseen, but delays 
in the legislative process  and uncertainty  about its outcome might well 
exacerbate any underlying disturbance. 
The loss of  flexibility that a constant growth rate rule would imply for 
the Fed in dealing with run-of-the-mill small disturbances would probably 
not be any great loss; it would essentially be the end of  fine tuning. But 
economic instability might be seriously worsened if the legislative process 
made it impossible for the Fed to react to a financial panic or to react 
in a situation, such as a deep recession, when action was clearly called 
for. 
The Case for a Rule 
The advantages of  a rule are in large part the disadvantages of  dis- 
cretion. The alleged tendency of  the Fed to undertake action that is too 
much and too late would be reduced by the introduction of  CGRR, or 
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avoided. Policies that reduce the money stock at a time when it should 
be increased-as  during the Great Depression-would  be avoided. The 
accountability  of  the Fed for  its  actions  would  be  enhanced, since its 
task  would be  well defined.  The record  shows that CGRR would  not 
have  been  much  worse than  actual  monetary  policy  during the  post- 
World War I1 period. 
Another  argument against  discretion  has recently been  advanced by 
Kydland  and  Prescott  ( 1977)  .38 The Kydland  and Prescott  argument 
is essentially that the Fed always or usually has an incentive to change 
monetary  policy  (the  argument  is  a  general  one  that  applies  to any 
policy)  once the private  sector has  committed  itself  to a set of  plans 
based on given expectations of  policy. For instance, to take a not irrele- 
vant example, if the public has adjusted to a relatively low rate of  infla- 
tion,  it  might  be in  the Fed’s  interest to accelerate the inflation  rate, 
apparently improving the short-run situation. 
If the  Fed has discretionary power, it might  sometimes face the in- 
centive to exploit the short-run  Phillips trade-off. By  a similar token, it 
rarely  seems a good  time to reduce the  inflation rate.  But why  should 
the Fed want to act in a way that invalidates the private sector’s expec- 
tations. The typical  argument is that the Fed reads the election returns 
and that it, discretely to be sure, does the bidding of  the president. This 
argument implies the view,  no longer novel,  that political  success can 
be bought by  policy which  is  not in  the public’s real interest.  (It also 
implies that the Fed can systematically affect output.) Although democ- 
racy is frequently invoked in the argument for rules, it is not clear what 
democracy  requires in this case. 
I believe there  is in fact a conflict between  the short- and long-run 
interests  of  the  public  in  the  political  business  cycle  and  that  some 
weight should on that account be given to rules. But I would feel much 
easier about this argument for rules  if  I did not have the suspicion that 
it  is a  rationalization  of  the  typical  economist’s belief  (shared by  the 
public) that inflation is a more serious problem than the revealed prefer- 
ence of  the political process, or any serious economic analysis, suggests, 
and that inflation control has therefore to be  imposed, if  necessary by 
rule. 
A Modified Constant Growth Rate Rule or MAP 
Friedman (1960) made only modest claims for CGRR, namely, that it 
would prevent  the Fed from making major mistakes. The serious draw- 
38.  A  similar problem  is  examined  in  Calvo  1978. The remarkable feature  of 
the Kydland-Prescott result is that  it  can  apparently occur  even  if  the policy  au- 
thority is maximizing  the expected  utility  of  the  representative individual,  and if 
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back of a strict form of  CGRR is the possibility that monetary policy will 
be immobilized precisely at a time when it is obviously useful. 
The question that then arises is whether CGRR would not in practice 
be the best of  all worlds,  given the right of  the Fed to ask for changes 
in  the  rule.  There would  then  be  CGRR  in  the  ordinary  course of 
events,  and  active monetary  policy  when  circumstances  warranted- 
which  is  precisely the modified  activist policy ,described in  section  4. 
However, given the delays of  the legislative process, CGRR in practice 
could well be destabili~ing,~~  particularly in the case of  a financial panic. 
A similar solution, which I favor, would leave the initiative for taking 
action with  the Fed,  but  would  maintain  the presumption  that  in the 
ordinary  course  of  events,  monetary  policy  would  be passive.  Under 
such  a  solution,  the  Fed  would  be  expected  to  maintain  a  constant 
growth rate rule and would be required to explain ex post  (within some 
specified period)  all deviations from the constant growth rate path to a 
congressional review panel. 
This latter solution is very close to the current situation. It is beyond 
the scope of  this paper, and my  ability, to specify the legislative formula 
that would be required to make the Fed follow its targets more closely 
than it has since 1975. More Congressional supervision and more public 
explanation from the Fed of  what it is doing are both to be welcomed in 
any event. 
It is not clear to me whether the proposed policy is a rule or discre- 
tion. It is a rule in that it prescribes expected conduct for the monetary 
authority, but  it leaves the Fed with sufficient discretion to take quick 
action if  that is necessary. 
6  Concluding Remarks 
I will not repeat the summary of  this paper, which is contained in the 
introduction. I want to make three final points. First, the purpose of  the 
paper was to discuss the possibility of  countercyclical, activist monetary 
policy in the light of  developments in macroeconomics associated with 
rational expectations. Much of  the paper was therefore devoted  to the 
question of  whether systematic monetary policy can have any real effects 
on  output.  Given the  need  to concentrate  on that question,  and  the 
absence from the paper of  a well-specified macro model, only the most 
general of  policy prescriptions could be made. 
Second, the reader  will have been  struck by the number of  places in 
the paper  at which it  is  asserted that there  is no very strong evidence 
favoring one position over another. The only strong statement the evi- 
39. Tax rates are not typically  changed rapidly. 234  Stanley Fischer 
dence on adoption of  a constant growth rate policy supports is that we 
do not know how such a policy would work. The conservative course is 
not to immobilize monetary policy when it might be useful in a reces- 
sion or panic. 
Third, the terms in which the argument is couched may seem unusual. 
But the general argument that is made for activist policy is not new. In 
Keynesian terms, the issue that is being discussed is whether “we should, 
in effect, have monetary management by the Trade Unions, aimed at full 
employment,  instead  of  by  the  banking  system”  (Keynes  1936, p. 
267). The answer given in this paper is that the central banking system 
rather than the private sector should provide monetary management. 
Appendix: The Barro Output Equation 
over the sample period 1948-76  is :  40 
A typical Barro output equation, estimated from data in Barro (1978) , 
(1)  logy, =  5.98 +  1.03 DMRt +-  1.18 DMRt-1 
(0.016) (0.23)  (0.23) 
(0.24)  (0.25) 
(0.11)  (.0004) 
+ 0.49 DMRt-2 +  0.20 DMRt-3 
.f  0.55 MILt+  .035  t 
SER =  0.0168, SSR =  .00622, DW =  1.81 
In this equation, y  is the level of  real GNP, DMR is the unanticipated 
component of the growth in the money stock, MIL is a measure of  the 
proportion  of  the prime  age male labor force that has been  drafted,4l 
and  t  is time. If  one  adds the  current and three  lagged values  of  the 
actual growth rate of  money to the regression  [this is equivalent to in- 
cluding the anticipated component of  the growth rate of  money), the sum 
of squared residuals falls to .005872. An F-test indicates that the hypoth- 
esis that the anticipated component of  money contributes to the explana- 
tion of  the behavior  of  output, given the inclusion  of  the variables in 
(1  ), is not accepted. 
Barro also estimates an equation in  which the actual rather than un- 
anticipated growth rates of  money serve as regressors, and fails to accept 
the hypothesis that the coefficients on the anticipated and unanticipated 
growth rates are the same, for his sample period. I find that I do accept 
that hypothesis for the 1948-76  period, but the power of  the test is very 
40. This sample period was chosen because I later introduce a variable that was 
41.  Barro expresses some dissatisfaction  over the inclusion of  the MIL variable 
conveniently available only over these years. 
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weak. Further, there is really no good reason to have a null hypothesis 
that the coefficients on anticipated and unanticipated money are the same, 
since verticality  of  the long-run Phillips curve is inconsistent  with that 
view. 
As noted  in the text,  a more relevant question about Barro’s results 
from  the viewpoint  of  activist  policy  concerns  the  time  interval  over 
which “unanticipated”  is defined. I have constructed  a variable  2DMT 
that is  the  anticipation, based  on information  available  at the end of 
period (t -  2),  of  the growth rate of  money in period t. The construction 
is straightforward insofar as the money rule depends on lagged growth 
rates of  money.  It also depends on the unemployment rate, for which 
I formed expectations using Barro’s unemployment  equation  (1977~). 
Finally,  the exogenous variables FEDV, MIL, and  MINW42  were  as- 
sumed  known  with  perfect  foresight.  As might  be expected, the con- 
structed variable is collinear with DMR (correlation coefficient of  0.65) 
and DMR lagged once (correlation coefficient of  0.82)  .43 As might also 
be expected, the data are not able to tell us whether the two-period ahead 
unanticipated growth rate of  money has significant independent effects on 
output. Adding the variable (DMt -  2DMT) to the Barro equation  (1  ) 
reduces the sum of  squared residuals from .00622 to .00547. If  the cur- 
rent value of  the DMR variable is then deleted from the regression, the 
sum of  squared residuals rises only slightly, to .00553.  Neither variable 
has a significant coefficient when both  are included in the equation. We 
conclude that the data cannot tell us whether  only  one-year  ahead or 
only  two-year  ahead  errors in  predicting  money  or both contribute  to 
explaining the behavior of 
Comment  Robert E. Hall 
It is noteworthy that Lucas and Fischer have no disagreement about the 
rationality of  expectations, in spite of  their very different views about the 
conduct of  macroeconomic policy. The largest point of  disagreement is 
the fixity of prices in the short run. Fischer believes prices to be sufficiently 
rigid over a span of, say, two years to provide a fulcrum for monetary 
policy to move real output. Lucas is skeptical both on the existence of 
such a fulcrum in all but the shortest runs and on the wisdom of  encour- 
42.  For definitions see Barro  1977a, 1978. 
43.  The sample period  1948-76  was used because  (DM-2DMT)  was available 
only over that period. 
44. F tests are inconclusive:  given  the inclusion  of  the  two-year forecast  error, 
the  hypothesis  that  the DMR  variable  is  irrelevant to  the  explanation  of  output 
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aging the monetary authorities to make use of  it. Neither is dogmatic on 
the point. Fischer recognizes the weakness of the evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that active monetary policy can smooth real output in a de- 
sirable way, while  Lucas  concedes the possibility  of  effective policies 
of  this kind as a matter of  theory. 
Many speakers at this conference have emphasized the inadequacy of 
current knowledge on the key question of  price rigidity. Though Lucas 
was  a great  pioneer  in  trying  to  make  sense of  the hypothesis  within 
standard  economic  theory,  he  does  not  try  to develop  his views any 
further  here.  Fischer  points  out  that many  relevant  transactions  take 
place under contracts. It is costly to make these contracts contingent on 
aggregate economic variables  apart from consumer prices. But this line 
of  argument seems to start from a presumption that the natural noncon- 
tingent contract predetermines prices  (or wages)  and lets the buyer de- 
termine quantity later in  response to further information. If  such con- 
tracts  are common, aggregate supply will be highly price-elastic,  and a 
relatively  Keynesian  set  of  conclusions  and  prescriptions  will  follow. 
There is  no good  reason  for  this  type  of  contract  to be  the starting 
point,  though. As far as I can see, most contracts for goods have the 
simple form of predetermining both quantity and price. Nobody  argues 
that this kind of  contract yields Keynesian conclusions, and it certainly 
involves no expensive contingencies. In the labor  market, contracts do 
seem to permit quantity variations during the contract, but they do not 
predetermine the wage.  Rather, compensation varies with  employment 
along a schedule established in the contract. At the theoretical level, this 
problem is studied in an important paper by Calvo and Phelps  (1977) 
and in a subsequent paper of  mine with David Lilien  ( 1979  ) . My own 
empirical work  (1974) has shown the importance of  variations in wage 
rates during the term of  a union contract. Obviously, much more work 
needs to be done on this important question. 
Fischer indicates the importance of  the issue of  the way that monetary 
policy affects real output with  a lag. If  the lag of  two years arises be- 
cause prices are sticky over a two-year period, then the scope for useful 
monetary  policy  is  enlarged. If  it  arises  because  a  monetary  surprise 
brings  about a predictable  shift  in  the  economy’s equilibrium level of 
output, a very different and probably less activist prescription for mone- 
tary policy emerges. Without further assumptions, that data cannot dis- 
tinguish these two hypotheses  (Sargent  19766). In the empirical work 
reported  here,  Fischer’s  implicit  identifying assumptions  relate  to  the 
irrelevance of  fiscal and other variables in predicting fluctuations in real 
output. As he discovers, even these assumptions are inadequate to make 
the  distinction.  The problem  can  be  put  in  the  following  ways:  The 
two-year-ahead  forecast error for money incorporates  new information 
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(but not exactly)  the same information goes into the current one-year- 
ahead forecast error and into next year’s one-year-ahead  error. The re- 
sult is severe multicollinearity  among these three variables and the in- 
ability to distinguish the two hypotheses. 
Fischer  presents  an  admirably  cautious  discussion  of  the  aggregate 
supply function that underlies Barro’s evidence of  monetary nonneutral- 
ity. As he points out, there are two leading explanations, one of  Lucas’s 
and a Keynesian alternative. I share some of  Fischer’s misgivings about 
the relevance of  Lucas’s model for, say, the American economy. I would 
add that Lucas’s critical assumptions of  the unavailability of  information 
about  the aggregate economy  seem particularly  inappropriate.  But my 
own  work  (1979)  has  suggested  that  the  necessary  amount  of  inter- 
temporal  substitutability  of  labor  supply  may  actually  be  present.  I 
reach  a mixed, but  generally negative, verdict  about the application of 
Lucas’s model to the behavior of  the U.S. economy, just as Fischer does. 
But Fischer does not apply the same level of  criticism to the Keynesian 
hypothesis  of  wage-price  stickiness. There is a slight suggestion in  the 
paper  that  the Keynesian  hypothesis  must  be  right  to the extent that 
Lucas is wrong. To my mind, we lack so far any presentation of  Keynes- 
ian ideas on the same level of  rigor and clarity as Lucas’s work.  The 
model implicit  in  most Keynesian work  says that prices  and wages are 
sticky and that labor demand, not labor supply, determines employment 
(this  is  certainly  true for the  basic  IS-LM  model). In  the Keynesian 
story,  the  labor  market  operates  off  the  labor  supply  function,  for 
reasons  which  so  far  have  not  been  successfully explained.  It is  not 
enough  just  to invoke  the  practical  reality  that wages  and prices  are 
sticky. We need  to explain  why  demand wins  and  supply loses in the 
contest to determine employment in the face of  stickiness. Obviously I 
agree with Fischer’s basic theme that we are far from understanding the 
sources of  monetary nonneutrality. 
On the policy issues discussed by Lucas and Fischer, my own views are 
not especially strong and I do not have too much to say. I have learned 
that policymakers do not  listen to unsolicited  advice from economists, 
Economists  are invited  to advise  in  two  very  different  circumstances. 
The Federal  Reserve  and  the  White House  ask  for recommendations 
about what to do in the next few months.  Here the economist who re- 
plies that the wrong approach to policy formulation is being taken and 
that a simple fixed policy rule should be instituted in its place is never 
taken seriously and is never asked back. At those meetings, it seems to 
me, the best we can do is suggest that negative policy surprises not occur 
in  recessions  nor positive  surprises in booms.  I might  even  go  a little 
further and recommend a positive surprise in a recession. 
The second opportunity is congressional consideration of  changes in 
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monetary  growth  rule  in  the  past  and it might  again.  Then I confess 
some ambivalence about the desirability of a fixed growth rule for mone- 
tary policy. On the one hand, I find Fischer’s description of  good dis- 
cretionary  policy  very  attractive.  No rule  can  remotely  approach  the 
flexibility of  an  intelligent,  well-trained,  and  well-intentioned  human 
being. If  I thought Stan Fischer were going to make monetary policy uni- 
laterally, I would happily endorse his approach to the conduct of  policy. 
On the other hand, it seems clear to me that we would have been much 
better off  under a fixed growth rule than under the kind of  discretionary 
policy we  have  had  under  the  Federal Reserve  system. By  and large, 
money growth seems to have accelerated  in booms and slowed in reces- 
sions, though the facts apparently admit several interpretations. Fischer’s 
discussion seems excessively optimistic about our potential for reversing 
the dismal record of  past discretionary policy. 
Comment  Mark H. Willes 
I suppose I have been asked to make some comments at this conference 
because, as a policymaker, I am a consumer of  macroeconomic analysis. 
I cannot presume to discuss things at a sophisticated technical level. As 
a consumer, I feel the conference-specifically  the two papers by Lucas 
and Fischer that I was asked to discuss-has  provided several important 
contributions to the policy debate. 
First,  both  of  these  papers  highlight  what  seems  to be  a  growing 
awareness that policymakers should not ask for policy solutions, because 
at the moment economists are not capable of  providing them. It  is true 
that Fischer  says, and I think most of  us would agree, that in principle 
there should be models available that can supply the policies we want. 
As he puts it, “In principle, the optimal monetary policy to be used for 
stabilization  can be studied by using an appropriately specified macro- 
econometric model, which pays due attention to the effects of  changes in 
policy regime  on  the  structure  of  the  model.  Such models  are not in- 
herently impossible to build.” 
But his paper does not contain such a model, nor am I aware of  any 
generally accepted model of  that kind. In fact, the discussion of  this con- 
ference points out to me, at least, the significant difficulties of  both theory 
and estimation, which are yet to be overcome before such a policy model 
is in fact available. In the meantime, it seems to me that policymakers 
should  not  demand  so much  of  policy  advisors,  and  in  return, policy 
advisors  should  not  offer so much  specific  advice to policymakers.  In 
this  respect  I  find  it  encouraging  that  both  Lucas  and  Fischer  are 
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comes  out  in  favor of  some  “activist”  policy,  goes  on  to state  that 
“fine tuning has to be cautious” and “fairly passive.” Clearly, those are 
rather muted calls for action compared with some I have heard. 
A second significant contribution to the policy debate, related to the 
first, that I see emerging from these two papers is a growing consensus 
that policymakers ought to be thinking not in terms of  putting out fires 
but in terms of developing an acceptable and stable process  or rule for 
setting monetary poIicy instruments. 
Macroeconomists now  seem to agree  about what  it would  mean  to 
have a quantitative solution to the problem of  “making policy optimally,” 
at least  within  the  confines  of  a  given  institutional  structure.  First,  it 
would be necessary to have in hand an econometric model (with actual 
numbers  estimated for  the  parameters)  that  accurately describes how 
people would behave over an interesting range of  alternative situations. 
Second,  after  the  policymaker  reveals  his  preference  for  alternative 
possible aggregate economic outcomes, determining policy becomes the 
(undoubtedly difficult) technical matter of  deriving the “optimal control 
law” for the policy instruments that the authority controls. The control 
theory expert is clear in what he means by a “policy”:  it is a feedback 
rule  or,  in effect, an entire probability distribution for the government 
policy instrument, contingent on information that the authority will have 
in  hand  at the time that it must  act. For a collection of  mathematical 
equations to qualify as a model in the sense used above, it is necessary 
for it to describe peoples’ economic behavior over the range of  possible 
policies that the policymakers  and their control theory experts want to 
consider. 
Many of  us in the late  1960s gave the impression  that we possessed 
collections of  equations  (or soon would possess them) that qualified as 
models in this sense. Finding good methods for calculating the optimal 
feedback rules for those systems became an important topic. 
As  Fischer implies, however, it understates matters to say that the opti- 
mism of the late 1960s about the early successful completion of  this re- 
search  program  has  evaporated  in  recent  years.  Two  related  factors 
caused this. First, the best big models failed to predict important aspects 
of  the  1970s, including  unemployment-inflation  interactions.  Second, 
partly  in  response  to the  first event,  the existing econometric systems 
could not  be  taken  seriously as models  of  behavior  that could  be ex- 
pected  to hold  up under a variety of  hypothetical monetary  and fiscal 
policies  (feedback  rules), as Lucas  argued on theoretical grounds. As 
I understand  it, Lucas’s point  was  that for macroeconometric work  it 
will just  not do to formulate theories  and  econometric equations  at a 
level that corresponds only to demand curves or supply curves. Formu- 
lating things at this level is too shallow, in the sense that economic theory 
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to change with a change in the nature of  the environments that they face. 
But the changes in monetary and fiscal policy feedback rules necessarily 
occasion  such  changes  in  the  environments  that  economic  decision 
makers  cope with.  Therefore,  their  demand  or supply  curves,  that is, 
their rules for setting decisions as functions of  the things that they see, 
will change with a change in the policy rule. 
One important negative implication of  this argument of  Lucas’s is that 
big econometric systems in the style of  the late 1960s cannot be regarded 
as models that will remain invariant under policy changes. This is because 
they consist only of  collections of  estimated demand curves and supply 
curves and nothing deeper. It follows that the systems of  equations com- 
prising most current econometric models are not suitable objects to hand 
over to a control theory  expert for calculating the optimal rule.  I find 
this argument of  Lucas’s compelling in its logic, even if  it is disconcerting 
in implying that we are now much further from being able to promise a 
quantitative prescription for optimal monetary policy than we seemed to 
be ten or fifteen years ago. 
An  equally  important  positive  element  of  Lucas’s  argument  is  his 
pointing the way to how macroeconometric work can be done in a man- 
ner  designed to isolate those aspects of  economic behavior that will re- 
main invariant across different choices of  policy rule. Put differently, the 
strategy must be to estimate objects that will enable us to predict how 
economic actors will  change their  dynamic demand  curves  and supply 
curves  in  response  to changes  in  the  random  environments that they 
face. Ideally, this strategy involves rolling back what is estimated from 
the stage of  demand and supply curves, to the stage of  the parameters 
of  the preference functions, production functions, and random elements 
that agents face. Then when agents are assumed to face new and different 
environments,  predictions  can  be  made  about  how  their  demand  and 
supply  curves  will  change. All  of  this is  much  easier said  than  done. 
Work along these lines is in its infancy and involves a number of  difficult 
econometric and  theoretical  problems.  Serious work  along this  line  is 
being done at the Federal Reserve Bank of  Minneapolis and elsewhere. 
But it is my understanding that we  are a very long way from having a 
quantitative, empirically verified econometric model of  the economy that 
meets the standards that have been delineated. Nevertheless, I have been 
encouraged  by  what I sense  is  a  rather  widely held  view,  at least by 
participants in this conference, of  the need to build models in a different 
way  from in the past and with emphasis on policy rules, rather than on 
ad hoc policy advice to meet short-run  economic problems. 
One final point flows from what I have said so far. Fischer seems to 
suggest that devotion to rational  expectations implies that its adherents 
forswear the use of  countercyclical stabilization policy. Coming from one 
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is  not  required  in  principle.  For example,  as I  understand  it,  Sargent 
and Wallace  (1975)  did not  argue that no  economic models could be 
imagined in which effective systematic countercyclical  policy was feasi- 
ble; rather, I understand  the point  of  that paper to be that within the 
context of  the simple model that they studied, it mattered  a great deal 
for the choice of  the policy rule whether expectations are assumed to be 
rational instead of  being fixed in the face of  alternative choices of  rules. 
That  main  implication of  their results would  also characterize models 
modified to incorporate the various nonneutralities catalogued by Fischer. 
The potential  existence  of  such  nonneutralities  has  at least  arguable 
implications for the present policy choice  if  one simultaneously  admits 
that the currently available macroeconometric models cannot be used to 
analyze their quantitative importance. Even if  one subscribes to some or 
all of  the nonneutralities listed by Fischer, his declaration that “The ra- 
tional expectations theory . . . has become and will remain the leading 
theory of  expectations” in effect concedes that we are presently without 
a model for analyzing their quantitative dimensions and policy implica- 
tions. Consequently, until such models are available, it would seem that 
the  burden  of  proof  might  well  rest  on  those  who  advocate  activist 
policy intervention, rather than on those of  us who  argue for a rather 
steady policy course. 
Comment  Peter Howitt 
Although  the  conference revealed  many  important  points  of  disagree- 
ment among the participants, I believe there are some important points 
of  potential agreement that were not brought out in the discussion. The 
purpose of  this note is to highlight some of  these points. 
The first point  is  that whatever course of  action  is pursued by  the 
monetary  authorities,  it  should  be  announced  as  clearly  as possible 
and as soon as it is conceived. On the one hand, this point should cer- 
tainly  be  acceptable  to  those  who  argue  that  announced  monetary 
changes can have no real effects. According to this view the sooner and 
the more clearly  are  any  given monetary  changes  announced  the less 
potential  harm  they  do.  On  the  other  hand  the  point  should  also  be 
acceptable to those who believe that even announced monetary changes 
can  have  real  effects. According to the  most  extreme  version  of  this 
view,  monetary  actions  will  have  the  same  real  effects  whether  an- 
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nounced or not, so that the policy of  announcing any monetary changes, 
while  it  won’t  do any  good,  at  least  won’t  do harm  either.  The less 
extreme version, according to which expectations are formed rationally 
but money prices  are constrained  in the short run by the existence of 
long-term  contracts,  implies that this policy  of  announcing should im- 
prove economic welfare, because contracts signed after an announcement 
but before the corresponding policy change would otherwise have been 
inferred by  agents can incorporate more  accurate information as a re- 
sult of  the announcement, whereas other contracts will be unaffected. 
Acceptance of  this point of  agreement implies acceptance of  an even 
more important one-namely,  that in response to any clearly recognized 
deflationary  shock  in  aggregate  demand  the  money  supply  should  be 
increased above what it would otherwise have been. This may appear to 
be  a contentious point that could  be  accepted  only by  an activist who 
denied the hypotheses of  rational expectations and/or  the Lucas aggre- 
gate supply function. But even to an advocate of  these hypotheses the 
point is at worst  innocuous. For according to his view, as long as the 
monetary change is  announced,  it can have no real effects; it does no 
good but it does no harm either. Indeed, if  some weight is given to price 
stability as a goal, then even this extreme view  implies that the policy, 
as long as it does not overreact, will be positively beneficial. 
This last point is even consistent with believing in  rules rather than 
discretion, as long as the rule allows for feedback loops. It says that the 
rule ought to adapt to clearly identifiable deflationary disturbances. 
There  may  be  some  doubt  raised  about  whether  or not  such  dis- 
turbances exist. I believe that this existence question is answered affirma- 
tively by the single example of  the events of  late 1929 and early  1930. 
No one doubts that aggregate demand declined  in this period in a way 
that  could have  been recognized  in  time  to prevent  the monetary  col- 
lapse  following  October  1930, and  not  even  Friedman  and  Schwartz 
argue that the decline was entirely attributable to monetary policy itself. 
Some doubt may also be raised about how much of  a reaction there 
should be. This depends upon  one’s estimate of  the relevant parameters 
and the  size of  the shock. But the point  is that in  the face of  such a 
deflationary shock it  is  hard  to imagine how  anyone’s guess about the 
best  monetary reaction could  be  other than positive. In any such situ- 
ation  there should be some positive reaction in the money supply that 
all among a finite number of  economists agree is better than nothing. 
Advocates of  the rational expectations equilibrium approach may not 
appreciate being placed upon this common ground of  agreement. But it 
seems to be implied by the logic of  their argument. In my  view this re- 
flects a previously unseen aspect of  the Sargent-Wallace proposition. The 
argument that systematic monetary policy is useless for affecting output 
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potential limitations of  activism, at the same time it strengthens the case 
for activism by showing how to avoid the potential dangers of  which the 
rational expectations argument has warned, namely, by making sure that 
all monetary changes are announced. 
General Discussion 
In response to Hall’s comment that in most labor contracts firms had to 
choose labor input  at a wage that varies  with  the input level, Fischer 
said  that the  crucial issue  was whether  the  overtime  wage was  based 
only on the amount of  work, as he believed, or else changed depending 
also on the macroeconomic disturbance affecting the economy. 
Lucas commented that there was confusion over what is required to 
make a case for activism. Such a case requires an argument to the effect 
that enough is known  of  the workings of  the actual economy to permit 
successful activist policy, as opposed to purely hypothetical examples of 
economies in which activist policies might be successful. 
Alan Blinder claimed that policy had not always been bad. Taxes were 
cut in  196465  and raised  in  1968, as they should have been, though 
perhaps  the  tax increase had  been delayed  too  long. Barro’s  reaction 
function,  in which  the Fed increased  the growth  rate of  money  when 
unemployment  rose,  showed that the Fed  followed the tenets of  good 
monetary policy as outlined in Robert Hall’s remarks. Finally he noted 
that real output has been much more stable since World War I1 than it 
was before, and this was supposedly the period  in which policymakers 
had followed Keynesian policies. 
William Poole argued that there is an overwhelming case that a stable 
money growth policy would have been superior to the policies we have 
had. The one exception he saw to the optimality of  stable money growth 
was  that  the  central  bank  should  intervene  in  liquidity  and  financial 
crises  such as the  Penn Central  and Franklin  National  episodes. The 
overall goal of  the central bank should be to avoid doing damage. 
Herschel Grossman commented first on Fischer’s paper. He presented 
two reasons why unanticipated money might affect output:  (  1  ) utilizing 
information is costly, in which case there is room for systematic mone- 
tary policy to have an effect, and  (2) current information is noisy,  in 
which case it does not follow that systematic monetary policy can have 
real effects. 
Turning to Lucas’s paper, Grossman remarked that while Lucas felt 
that we did not at present know enough to develop rules better than the 
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He was risk  averse  and was  satisfied that the Friedman  rule would  at 
least  prevent  catastrophe.  He did  wonder  whether  there  would  be  a 
transitional problem in moving to a constant growth rate policy. 
Robert Gordon asked what basis Lucas had for the recommendation 
of balancing the budget on average, in contrast to Martin Bailey’s con- 
clusion  that  the  optimal budget  surplus could be positive  or negative. 
He also commented that it would be useful to look at other countries, 
such as Germany, in studying labor contracts. 
Robert Solow addressed himself to the political theory of  fixed rules: 
Congress  cannot  legislate  a  permanent  money  rule  because  the  next 
Congress may amend or repeal the legislation. It was only people present 
in the room who thought the money supply was (in a manner of  speak- 
ing)  the most important thing in the world and that it should be deter- 
mined  by  fixed  rules.  If  constitutional  amendment  were  suggested to 
implement a money rule, we would be creating the precedent for consti- 
tutional  rules  for  foreign  policy,  taxes,  tariffs,  and  other  matters  that 
are at present adequately handled by legislation. 
Solow added that modesty  and caution in  the making of  policy did 
not  necessarily imply sweeping changes such as a constant growth rate 
rule for money. 
Karl Brunner said that the type of  statement made by Solow should 
not be made without reading Buchanan and Tullock on the behavior of 
politicians and bureaucrats. He argued that it was perfectly legitimate to 
ask what the role of  the government should be  and what governmental 
actions should be constrained by constitutional rules. 
Frank Morris  said that the disarray of  policymakers at present mir- 
rored  the disarray of  economists; policy had  currently to operate in  a 
theory vacuum. He agreed with Hall that the rate of  growth of  money 
should be increased  in recessions  and decreased in booms. He thought 
that monetary policy rules make considerable sense in a stable environ- 
ment, but not during an unstable period. 
Phillip Cagan remarked that as a practical matter there was little dif- 
ference between a nonactivist and mildly discretionary policy. To achieve 
a constant growth policy from where we were at present, he thought the 
best way was to slowly decelerate. Although this would result in a period 
of  slack, when it came to be realized that policy had definitely changed, 
expectations would  adjust and the economy  would  move more readily 
toward full employment with reduced  inflation. He was not sure, how- 
ever, that the initial period of  slack would be politicaIly acceptable. 
Jerry Green discussed the nonexistence  of  full contingent contracts. 
He argued that if  people are rational enough to form rational expecta- 
tions, they  should  be  able to write  contingent  contracts  against  major 
disturbances, but he doubted whether the welfare gains from these con- 
tracts could be sufficient to provide the incentive to write them. 245  On Activist Monetary Policy with Rational Expectations 
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